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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore the firm characteristics of family-managed firms in 
Malaysian public-listed firms. Selected firms were matched for size and industry before 
comparisons were made between the family-managed firms and non-family-managed 
firms. The data were collected using secondary sources. Various firm characteristics were 
investigated. The findings indicate that firms managed by families have a significantly larger 
board size, higher number of non-independent directors and executive directors and their 
directors have significantly longer experience working in the firm. However, the results 
suggest that the directors of these family-managed firms significantly lack professional 
qualification and tend to have fewer meetings compared to those directors in non-family-
managed firms. The findings also indicate that the compensations paid to the executive 
directors of family-managed firms are significantly higher than those paid to executive 
directors of non-family managed firms. The results also suggest that these firms have not 
utilised their assets efficiently to generate sales compared to their non-family-business 
counterparts.
Keywords: Family managed firms, firm characteristics, Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Family firms are unique (Saito, 2008). It is 
also claimed that there are differences in the 
way family firms are run compared to the 
way non-family firms are run. McConaughy 
et al. (1998) claim that family businesses are 
more efficient in managing their businesses. 
This ownership structure is claimed to 
be common among public-listed firms 
in developed and developing countries, 
and contribute to wealth creation and 
job generation in the development of the 
economy (Jorissen et al., 2007). Faccio 
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and Lang (2002) find that 44 % of firms in 
Western Europe are controlled by families. 
Anderson et al. (2003) reveal that founding 
families are present in one third of 500 firms 
in the US, and more than 50 % of businesses 
in East Asia are family-owned (Tsai et al., 
2006). Saito claims that it is important 
to generate stylized facts on family firms 
from different countries because of the 
various characteristics of the countries, 
such as their legal system and corporate 
governance system, which may affect the 
family firms. Family businesses are claimed 
to be different from non-family businesses 
because they are owned or controlled by 
family members, and, thus, have a great 
potential for the family to be involved in 
or influence business matters (Jorissen 
et al., 2007). Despite the significance of 
these businesses, prior studies claim that 
very little research has been done in less 
developed countries where their corporate 
governance mechanisms are still evolving 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Yatim et al., 2006).
This  paper  at tempts  to  explore 
the corporate governance structure of 
family-managed firms among public-
listed firms in Malaysia. Besides being 
a developing country with an emerging 
market in Asia, Malaysia was chosen for 
this study because of its unique concentrated 
business environment. It is claimed that 
owner-managed firms are common among 
Malaysian firms (Mat Nor & Sulong, 2007), 
especially in the form of family businesses 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hanazaki & 
Liu, 2006). This claim is further supported 
by Ow-Yong and Guan (2000), who posit 
that listed firms in Malaysia evolved from 
traditional family-owned firms, and some of 
these firms continue to be managed as such. 
Unlike firms with dispersed shareholdings, 
these firms are believed to have reduced 
agency problems and agency costs due 
to a better match of control and cash 
flow rights of the shareholders (Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). In 
order to examine the differences in the 
characteristics and corporate governance 
structure between public listed firms which 
are managed by families and those managed 
by nonfamilies, a comparison is made 
between the groups. Among others, board 
size, board activity, the education level 
of the directors and remuneration of the 
directors are investigated. 
The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows. Literature Review gives a review 
of the relevant literature and Methodology 
describes the sample and methodology used 
for the study. Result and Discussion presents 
and discusses the empirical results and, 
finally, Conclusion provides the conclusions 
of the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Family businesses are regarded as the 
most common ownership structure around 
the world (La Porta et al., 1999). It is 
claimed that the structure of family firms 
is different compared to non-family firms. 
This structure would normally affect their 
governance structure, such as the selection 
of their board members, the CEO and their 
decision processes (Bartholomeusz & 
Tanewski, 2006). Family businesses would 
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normally choose their family members to 
sit on their boards and to be their chairman. 
Horii (1991) observes that family businesses 
tend to place their family members in the top 
management position of the organisations. 
In addition, knowledge and expertise 
are more likely to be passed on within 
families as opposed to shared with outsiders 
(Andres, 2008). Even though professionals 
are more qualified, family enterprises 
will only hire professionals after their 
businesses reach a critical size because they 
believe the professional interest may not 
be aligned with the interest of the family 
(Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001). 
Family businesses are also claimed to have 
committed, undiversified stake in the firm 
and induce strong incentive to monitor as 
the firm survival and its value maximisation 
are important to them (Fleming et al., 2005).
Tsai et al. (2006) claimed that informal 
family influence is more powerful than 
formal authority in Taiwanese family firms 
because CEOs and top management are also 
family members. Tsai et al. find that CEO 
turnover is significantly lower in family 
firms and its relation to firm’s performance 
is negative. They further claim that there 
are two opposite effects of family firms: 
the family firms have sufficiently high 
ownership concentration to help solve the 
firms’ problem, and to discipline the CEO, 
but on the other hand, they may also create 
conditions for new agency problems, when 
the interests of the controlling shareholders 
and the managers are still not perfectly 
aligned. This is agreed by Andres (2008), 
who claims that family businesses with 
concentrated shareholdings have strong 
economic incentives to monitor managers 
and decrease agency costs; this is also due 
to the fact that the agency conflict does not 
arise as family members are also part of the 
executive board. However, this combination 
of management and control might also lead 
to sub-optimal investment decisions when 
the interests of the family are not in line 
with those of other shareholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). For example, it is claimed 
that the family’s role in selecting managers 
and members of the board may increase 
entrenchment and lower the firm value 
since the external parties can hardly capture 
control over the firm. It is also claimed that 
family control provides family members 
with a unique opportunity to use their 
concentrated block-holding to expropriate 
the wealth of outside shareholders through 
excessive compensation, related-party 
transactions, special dividends and risk 
avoidance (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 
2006).
It is claimed that these corporate 
governance attributes (such as its board 
size, and board leadership or role duality) 
are related to the corporate performance 
of the firm, (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Haniffa and Hudaib posit that the size 
of the board does matter as it affects the 
extent of monitoring, controlling and 
decision-making in a firm. Small boards 
are said to help in alleviating the effort 
problem and in becoming more effective. 
But, when they grow too big, boards 
become more symbolic rather than part of 
the management process. Jeremias (2007) 
Mazlina Mustapha and Zurimah Imam Muslim
102 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 99 - 110 (2013)
claims that firms might minimise agency 
costs if the board of directors effectively 
supervises managers. Accordingly, there 
are arguments that the boards’ manager-
monitoring activities will be more effective 
when they are dominated by independent, 
outside directors. Furthermore, the value of 
outside directors is related to their ability 
to judge firm performance objectively; 
inside directors may lack this quality, which 
will limit their effectiveness as corporate 
monitors. Boards of directors which are 
more independent from management tend to 
perform management-monitoring activities 
more effectively, which will in turn minimise 
the likelihood of managers engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour, and discipline 
them to run the firm more efficiently. But 
in family businesses, the family members 
are normally appointed as the directors 
and sit on the board, thus, they are not 
independent. Lansberg (1999) argues that, 
in the case of family businesses, even when 
they are well stocked with independent 
outsiders, they tend to focus too narrowly 
on business issues. Too often, independent 
directors are not chosen for any particular 
knowledge or sensitivity to the family side 
of the business. On the contrary, they are 
selected for precisely the opposite reasons; 
for example, because they are from the 
larger corporate world, they presumably 
have much experience into which the family 
firm can tap. 
A study by Amran and Che Ahmad 
(2009) finds evidence that independent 
directors’ background and competencies are 
essential factors that contribute positively to 
family firms. The study claims that family 
firms are facing challenges in searching for 
qualified directors to sit on their boards and 
encounter the problem of incompetence 
agents. Amran and Che Ahmad conclude 
that educational background and skills may 
influence the performance of family firms. 
They further claim that a family’s special 
technical knowledge concerning a firm’s 
operations may put it in a better position 
to monitor the firm more effectively. They 
also claim that families have the incentive 
of counteracting free-rider problems 
that prevent atomised shareholders from 
bearing the costs of monitoring, ultimately 
reducing agency costs. This is supported by 
another study, which claims that directors 
appointed among family members have 
excellent knowledge of the firm due to their 
long-standing relationship with the senior 
management of the firm. In addition, some 
family firms institute succession plans, 
which include training for successors (Smith 
& Amoako-Adu, 1999).
Jeremias (2007) claims that CEO 
duality might impede the effectiveness of 
a firm’s control mechanisms. He argues 
that the CEO and the chairman of the board 
should not be the same person in order to 
ensure that the board is more independent 
from management. If the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board of directors, he might 
have a significant influence on the board, 
which could diminish the board’s ability to 
oversee managerial decisions and activities 
and, thereby, negatively affect performance. 
The board, with the high influence of the 
management, will not be able to discipline 
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the management appropriately as the 
management who controls the board will 
over-rule such initiatives and a non-
executive chairman promotes a higher 
level of corporate openness. Jeremias 
(2007) claims that the existence of CEO 
duality could diminish the board’s ability 
to supervise management decisions and 
activities and, thus, give negative feedback 
on the firm’s performance. However, in 
family businesses, the firm would normally 
appoint the family member to be the CEO 
and chairman of the board.
Prior studies claim that structures of 
ownership will affect the firm’s performance 
(Saito, 2008; Tsai et al., 2006). Among 
others, family ownership is claimed to affect 
this relationship. Tsai et al. (2006) claim that 
family firms have a positive impact on firm 
values because they typically have longer 
planning horizons that result in valuable 
investment strategies. They conclude that 
family firms have effective organisational 
structures because they perform better 
compared to non-family firms. The evidence 
from McConaughy et al. (1998) proves that 
family relationship improves monitoring 
and provides incentives that are associated 
with better firm performance. This is 
supported by Anderson et al. (2003), who 
find evidence that family ownership is 
associated with lower agency cost of debt. 
After controlling for industry and firm 
specific characteristics, their study indicates 
that the costs of debts financing for family 
firms are lower than those in non-family 
firms. This is supported by McConaughy 
et al. (1998), who claim that the unique 
relationship between the family descendant 
in management and the firms holds the 
potential for improved monitoring and 
top managerial incentives. They find firm 
efficiency and value related to the person 
who owns and manages the firm. Family-
managed firms are managed by both tenure 
and their descendants, and for this reason, 
their firms are run more efficiently than 
they would be run by managers outside the 
family.
Thus, this study examines these 
corporate governance attributes of family 
businesses in Malaysian firms. Specifically, 
this study investigates the differences 
between the corporate governance attributes 
(such as board size, board activity, board 
independence and the existence of CEO 
duality) of family-managed firms and non-
family-managed firms.
METHODOLOGY
The study uses secondary data from annual 
reports of public-listed firms. These annual 
reports are available and downloadable from 
the website of the exchange1. Firstly, 50 
firms which were defined as family-managed 
firms were selected; then, after matching 
the industry category and size, another 50 
firms were selected and categorised as non-
family-managed firms. This study defines 
a firm as a family-managed firm if 2 or 
more directors on the board of directors 
are related, and at least one of the family 
members holds an executive director’s 
position in the firm and their shareholdings 
1http://www.announcements.bursamalaysia.
com
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are equal to or more than 20% (as used by 
Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). 
Independent t-tests were carried out to 
investigate the differences in the governance 
structure and characteristics between the 
two groups, namely family-managed firms 
and non-family-managed firms. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for sample firms 
used in this study are presented in Table 
1. The table shows the statistics of family-
managed firms and non-family-managed 
firms. 
The sample firms include firms from the 
industrial sector (40 firms), consumer sector 
(28 firms), trading/services sector(12 firms), 
properties sector (12 firms) and technology 
and plantation sector (4 firms each). The 
firms were categorised as family-managed 
firms and non-family-managed firms after 
matching for size and industry category.
Independent Sample T-test Analysis
Table 2 displays the independent t-test 
results relating to the characteristics and 
governance structure of sample firms from 
both categories, family-managed firms and 
non-family-managed firms. 
The first row of the table indicates that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
larger board size compared to the non-
family-managed firms. The average mean 
size is 8.4 compared to 6.86. This larger 
board may be attributed to a higher number 
of non-independent and executive directors 
in their firms as shown in the following 
rows. The results appear to suggest that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
higher number of non-independent directors 
(mean = 5.18) and executive directors (mean 
= 4.24), compared to non-family-managed 
firms. A plausible explanation for these 
significant results may be that family-
managed firms prefer to appoint family 
members who have shares and interests 
in the firms rather than outsiders to the 
board of directors as well as to manage 
the firm. This is consistent with earlier 
observations by Horii (1991), who posits 
that family businesses tend to place family 
members in the top management position 
of the organisations. It is further claimed 
that even though professionals are more 
qualified, family enterprises will only hire 
professionals after their businesses reach 
a critical size because they believe the 
professional interest may not be aligned 
with the interest of the family (Bhattacharya 
& Ravikumar, 2001). Thus, in the case of 
family businesses, the appointment of the 
independent directors may be done only 
because of the requirement by law. From 
the results in Table 2, it is observed that the 
number of independent directors in both 
categories of companies are about the same 
and not statistically different; this may be 
due to the fact that both categories are listed 
companies which are supposed to adhere 
to the law, which requires them to have a 
certain percentage of independent directors 
to monitor the management. 
The results also show that the chairman 
of the board is significantly related to the 
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CEO in family-managed firms compared to 
those in non-family-managed firms. Further 
investigation of this data reveals that 18 out 
of 50 of the chairman of the family-managed 
firms are related to the CEO, and another 
8 chairmen also act as CEOs for the firms. 
However, none of the chairmen is related 
to the CEO in non-family-managed firms. 
CEOs in family-managed firms appear to 
have significantly more years of experience 
(mean = 15.26 years) compared to their 
counterparts in non-family-managed firms 
(mean = 7.12 years). This may be due 
to the fact that in family businesses the 
descendant has been trained and developed 
to manage the firm and has been exposed 
to the working environment and culture of 
the firms from the start of the business, as 
it is claimed that some family firms develop 
succession plans and training for their 
successors (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
However, there is a significantly lower 
number of CEOs in family-managed firms 
who have professional qualification and 
higher education compared to those CEOs 
in non-family-managed firms. This may 
be due to the fact that in family managed 
firms, CEOs are appointed based on their 
family values and relationship, as well as 
their past experience in handling the family 
businesses rather than on educational or 
professional qualification. In these firms, 
older members of the family will continue 
to head the firm until they can pass the 
management to a suitable descendant. Their 
aim is to determine survival and safeguard 
the future of the firm as well as that of the 
following generations (Bhattacharya & 
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Ravikumar, 2001). On the other hand, CEOs 
of non-family-managed firms are usually 
appointed based on merit, knowledge and 
qualification.
As indicated in the last three rows of 
Table 2, the total directors’ compensation 
in family-managed firms also appears to be 
significantly higher than that of non-family-
managed firms. The detailed statistics 
show that this high compensation payment 
is due to the high payment to executive 
directors in compensation, which also 
shows a significant result. The descriptive 
statistics show that the average mean for 
total directors’ compensation and executive 
directors’ compensation is about 2.97 
million and 2.64 million respectively in 
family-managed firms, which is almost 
double the amount paid to their counterparts 
in non-family-managed firms of 1.47 million 
and 1.24 million respectively. However, the 
payment to the non-executive directors is 
approximately the same for both categories 
of firm, with the average mean of 2.5 
million for family-managed firms and 2.3 
million for non-family-managed firms, 
and the results indicate an insignificant 
difference. This result appears to suggest the 
possibility that family-managed firms adopt 
a different compensation plan compared to 
non-family-managed firms, as the payments 
would flow to the board members who are 
family members. Further investigation in 
this domain is needed before any conclusion 
can be made.
Family-managed firms appear to 
have significantly fewer board meetings 
compared to non-family-managed firms. 
A detailed investigation of the data reveals 
that the majority of the family-managed 
firms have either 4 or 5 meetings in a year, 
whereas the majority of the non-family-
managed firms have either 5 or 6 meetings 
every year. The law requires listed firms to 
have at least 4 meetings every year, or one 
meeting each quarter. The 4 or 5 meetings 
conducted by family-managed firms may be 
conducted to make sure that this requirement 
is fulfilled. Another plausible explanation 
is that as family members, they may have 
informal meetings during which some of the 
firms’ problems or issues may be solved or 
discussed, therefore, they may need fewer 
meetings than would non-family-managed 
firms, the board members of which rarely 
have the opportunity to meet without reason. 
In terms of performance, at 10 % level 
of significance, the total sales of family-
managed firms are statistically different 
compared to the total sales of non-family-
managed firms. Earnings before interest 
and tax and earnings per share of family-
managed firms are also statistically higher 
than those of non-family-managed firms. 
However, the results also indicate that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
lower asset utilisation ratio compared to that 
of non-family-managed firms. 
CONCLUSION
The objective of the study is to explore the 
differences between family-managed firms 
and non-family-managed firms in Malaysia. 
The findings indicate that governance 
characteristics of family-managed firms and 
non-family-managed firms are significantly 
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TABLE 2 
Independent Sample T-tests of the 100 Sample Firms
Variable Categories N Mean T value (sig)
Board size Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
8.40
6.86
4.158
(0.000)
No of independent directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
3.22
3.26
-0.224
(0.823)
No of  non-independent 
directors
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
5.18
3.60
5.431
(0.000)
No of  executive directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.24
2.26
8.320
(0.000)
No of  non-executive 
directors 
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.16
4.60
-1.260
(0.211)
No of related directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
3.94
.00
30.524
(0.000)
Independent 
directors (%)
Family-managed firms 
Nonfamily-managed firms
50
50
.3879
.4855
-4.836
(0.000)
Chairmen are related to CEO Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.36
.00
5.250
(0.000)
CEO Duality Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.16
.10
0.887
(0.378)
Years of CEO’s experience Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
15.26
7.12
5.050
(0.000)
CEO has  professional 
qualification
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.16
.82
-3.233
(0.002)
CEO has  higher education Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.4400
.6600
-2.244
(0.027)
Board activity (meetings) Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.94
5.50
-1.898
(0.061)
Total sales Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
389, 179, 837.68
263, 348, 846.40
1.730
(0.087)
Earnings before interest and 
tax
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
27, 649, 958.74
13, 603, 991.80
2.155
(0.034)
Asset utilisation ratio Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
1.6764
2.5031
-1.656
(0.091)
Earnings per share Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
12.9700
7.9068
1.610
(0.091)
Executive Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
2,642,152.84
1,236,856.78
3.317
(0.000)
Non-Executive Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed-firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
250, 095.02
230, 321.08
0.278
(0.781)
Total Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
2, 975, 760.50
1, 475, 562.52
3.475
(0.001)
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different. Firms managed by families have 
a significantly larger board size, higher 
number of non-independent directors and 
executive directors and their directors have 
a significantly longer experience working in 
the firm compared to non-family-managed 
firms. However, the results suggest that 
the directors of family-managed firms 
significantly lack professional qualification 
and tend to have fewer meetings compared to 
directors of non-family-managed firms. The 
findings also indicate that the compensations 
paid to the executive directors of family-
managed firms are significantly higher 
than those paid to executive directors of 
non-family-managed firms. Even though 
the family-managed firms appear to have 
significantly higher earnings per share and 
total sales compared to the non-family-
managed firms, they have not utilised their 
assets efficiently compared to non- family-
managed firms.
This study provides information to 
potential investors about the differences 
between family-managed firms and non-
family-managed firms. In addition, it also 
provides a basis for more detailed study 
on family-managed firms in Malaysia, 
where this unique concentrated business 
environment is claimed to be common.
However, the conclusions drawn from 
this study should be interpreted in a limited 
way, which would potentially represent 
opportunities for further investigation 
in future research. This study is a cross-
sectional study that uses data from one year 
only. Future research could extend the study 
to include data collected over more years for 
a longitudinal study.
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